Clinical Ethics > Volume 3, Number 1 > Pp. 42-45

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The withholding of truth when counselling relatives of the critically ill: a rational defence

Philip A Berry  

Kings College Hospital, Denmark Hill, London SE5 9RS, UK

E-mail: philaberry{at}hotmail.com

In cases of sudden, life-threatening illness where the chance of survival appears negligible to the admitting physician, this opinion is not always revealed during the initial meeting with the patient's relatives. Reasons as to why this withholding of the truth may be acceptable are explored through review of available evidence and personal reflection. Factors identified include: the importance of hope in families' coping mechanisms, and the instinct to preserve it; the fallibility of physicians' perception of poor prognosis in the early phase of illness; the need to avoid large swings in relatives' expectations that occur when patients appear to rally during initial resuscitation; and the adverse effect that an atmosphere of hopelessness can have on the provision of medical care. A strategy for the staged disclosure of information and the confirmation of hopelessness is then described, the aim being to find a compromise between providing a true opinion about a patient's prognosis, and regard for the opposing factors described.

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