Public Policy & Law |
Tilburg Institute for Law, Technology and Society, University of Tilburg, The Netherlands
E-mail: e.asscher{at}uvt.nl
Developments in biotechnology present difficult social and ethical challenges that need to be resolved by regulators among others. One crucial problem for regulators of new technologies is to ensure that regulation is both clear and sufficiently flexible to respond to new developments. This is particularly difficult to achieve in contentious fields such as medical biotechnology. In the European Union there is a divergence in the solutions to this problem which has lead to different regulatory frameworks for medical biotechnology. This paper compares and contrasts the British and Dutch regulatory frameworks for the selection of embryos by preimplantation genetic diagnosis as an example of the regulation of medical biotechnology. Some of the outcomes of the regulatory choices and possible reasons behind the divergent frameworks are discussed, such as the ethical outlooks and political systems in these countries.
| Introduction |
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In the countries of the European Union, national regulation has lead to different outcomes with respect to the permissiveness towards reproductive technologies and PGD. The UK is fairly liberal. In other words the UK leaves many choices about reproductive technologies up to the prospective parents, whereas, for example, Italy and Germany are much more restrictive.3 This divergence in regulatory outcomes is interesting because of the reasons behind these differences, such as the cultural, historical, political background and the regulatory framework, and because of the implications of diverging national rules within the European open market community in an increasingly globalized world, whereby reproductive tourism is an option and accessible for many.4 This paper aims to study one element of the differences in regulation in Europe by comparing the regulation of PGD in the UK and the Netherlands. The focus will be on the comparison of the regulatory frameworks to elucidate whether these may have influenced the regulatory outcomes, i.e. the selection criteria for PGD.
PGD is an important example of a new medical biotechnology, which offers great benefit to couples suffering from, or carrying, genetic diseases. As the technique relies on the creation of embryos outside the body and manipulation for genetic testing of the embryos, it raises existential questions about the status of the human embryo during development and the role of mankind in shaping its own future. Any regulatory response to this technique has to engage with these questions, and this is perhaps one of the reasons why legal frameworks for assisted reproduction and PGD were only established after delay.5
In view of the following comparison of the regulatory frameworks for PGD, it is important to consider conflicting challenges for the regulation of new technologies more generally. Regulation has to be both clear and consistent, and flexible enough to cope with rapid developments often inherent in emerging technologies. The solutions chosen for these particular problems are perhaps at the core of the difference between the regulatory frameworks for PGD in the Netherlands and the UK.
| Background |
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| Regulation of PGD |
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The legal framework of the HFE Act achieves several things.13 Crucially, it establishes the Human Fertilisation and Embryology Authority (HFEA), which is charged with licensing both individuals and clinics or laboratories for the following: treatments to alleviate infertility, for the storage of gametes and embryos, and for research on embryos.14 The HFEA is a relatively independent body, which has great decisional discretion15 as to which treatments may be licensed. It has dual roles, as highlighted by the House of Commons Select Committee on Science and Technology: The HFEA is both a policy-making and a licensing body. Policy is discussed and passed by the Authority itself.16 Thus, in the UK responsibility with regards to the development of policy and the regulation of treatments involving human embryos lies mainly with a semi-independent body. This raises important questions as to who the members of the HFEA are. The Act states that All the members of the Authority ... shall be appointed by the Secretary of State,17 leaving the responsibility for appointment with the government. In addition, there are clear requirements for the composition of the Authority: for instance, the HFEA consists of lay people and experts in order to allow balanced development of policy in this controversial area. The HFEA has great decisional discretion, as long as it remains in keeping with the spirit of the Act. Checks and balances are provided by the common law system, so that the decisions of the HFEA may be challenged by application to the courts. However, challenges brought to the extent of its remit have largely been unsuccessful.18
The regulatory framework in the UK can thus be characterized by the existence of a semi-independent body with a large amount of policy-making and decisional freedom, including more than 50% lay persons. The Authority acts within its legal framework based on the defined ethical framework. The HFE Act has been scrutinized by the Joint Select Committee on Science and Technology19 has been amended and was due to be replaced by the Human Fertilisation and Embryology Bill.20 This Bill has recently been delayed but one important aspect of the current regulatory framework was due to remain – the use of a semi-independent body for policy development and licensing.
Regulation of PGD in the Netherlands
The regulatory framework in the Netherlands has some clear differences from that of the UK. Although the regulations are embedded in legal texts, PGD is not accommodated in a single law, instead two laws impact on the regulation of PGD: the Embryowet, which is concerned principally with human embryos, and the WBMV, which sets up a licensing framework for new and developing medical treatments and technologies, particularly those which may lead to ethical or social concerns. Under the WBMV, the Secretary of State for Health has the power to generate Ministerial Decisions on contentious techniques when regulation is required and there is not enough time to go through the usual channels of law-making. As PGD is still considered contentious, it qualifies for WBMV regulation.
Consequently, policies for PGD have been established through Ministerial Decisions. Checks and balances are incorporated in the WMBV, including limited validity for these Decisions and the possibility for Parliament to request a draft bill instead of a Ministerial Decision. In the case of PGD, Parliament has not challenged the Ministerial Decisions. The decisions are informed by advice from the Health Council of the Netherlands,21 as well as input from patient groups and others. The Secretary of State is not bound to follow this advice, and occasionally appears to disregard it. It is important to note that the Netherlands has a true multiparty system with coalition governments and that the Secretary belongs to one of the coalition parties, which may have different views on ethically charged subjects such as PGD. As a result of this, and considering the lack of overarching ethical framework, the personal views of the Secretary may influence the regulatory outcomes.
Comparison of the regulatory frameworks
From the above it is clear that there are both similarities and differences between the regulatory frameworks for PGD in the UK and the Netherlands. First, both the UK and the Netherlands have enacted laws specifically to deal with human embryos created outside the body. Thus, both countries have felt the need for legislative action in response to the development of embryo manipulation outside the body, probably because of the contentious nature of human biotechnology. The resulting legal frameworks for embryo manipulation are important for the regulation of PGD. Both of these legal frameworks were developed based on ethical considerations; however, the motivation for policy decisions sometimes lacks clarity and transparency in the ethical arguments.22
Second, in both the regulatory frameworks for PGD have delegated decisional discretion on policy, as is often inherent in technology regulation. However, the mode of delegation is different in the two countries. In the UK, a new regulatory authority was established for policy-making and administration with regards to human embryos (the HFEA). In contrast, in the Netherlands an existing legal framework was employed to grant the Secretary of State for Health decisional authority for PGD policy-making. Whereas the HFEA provides a relatively public forum for ethical deliberations during this process, the Dutch Secretary may grapple with the ethical aspects of regulatory decisions but this need neither be deliberative nor public.
Third, the temporary regulatory framework for PGD in the Netherlands has not been revised or developed into law; in contrast, the legislative regulation of human embryos in the UK is currently being amended. The reasons behind this appear to be country and framework specific: due to the adversarial nature of the common law system, the British regulation has faced challenge.23 In addition, a broader public debate surrounding the regulation of artificial reproduction has developed, partially facilitated through public consultations by the HFEA.24 In contrast, the previous Dutch Secretary of State had been reluctant to revisit the temporary measures, which may be due to her political and ethical views, as the Secretary during the most recent window for change was a member of Christian Democrat Party (Christen Democratisch Appel [CDA]). Debates in the Dutch Parliament on these ethically charged techniques and policy seem to be rare, which may be because they could cause friction in coalition governments. Such friction occurred in the current coalition (PvdA – Labour; CDA – Christian Democrats; ChristenUnie – Christian Union), when the Secretary (PvdA) sent a policy decision to Parliament announcing the acceptability of partially penetrant genetic disorders, such as the breast cancer genes, as criteria for PGD.25 The junior coalition party, the Christen Unie (CU) threatened the coalition and demanded withdrawal of this letter.26 The letter was withdrawn but a month later partially penetrant disorders were confirmed as acceptable criteria supported by the whole cabinet.27 Interestingly, this crisis may lead to significant change in the regulatory framework, as the Cabinet also announced the creation of an ethics council, with some regulatory powers. However, the exact role and powers of this council will only be announced later.
Fourth, both the UK and the Netherlands have adopted a regulatory framework, whereby changes in policy regarding PGD are made by others than the elected Parliament. This aims to facilitate quick incorporation of new developments in regulation, as channels for law formation are notoriously slow and it may be some time before it is determined whether new technologies are allowed. However, those charged with decision-making are different in the two countries. In the UK, the HFEA is semi-independent, it has clear but loose ties to politics through the appointment of members of the authority, but there is limited direct political influence on the actions of it. The HFEA is empowered to make policy decisions based on the framework provided by the HFE Act and ethical principles from the Warnock report. In contrast, the Dutch system has charged the Secretary of State for Health to make regulatory decisions, thus allowing considerable political, and personal, decisional discretion on the regulation of PGD.
| Some conclusions |
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Distance exists in both countries between the elected Parliament and those charged with decisions on PGD regulation, with a larger distance in the UK than in the Netherlands. Such transfer of regulatory powers to others is often a feature of technology regulation and is likely to have profound impacts. The democratic legitimacy of the regulation may be negatively affected. When Parliament directly decides on laws and policy, democratic legitimacy is ensured. When these decisions are removed from the Parliament, a democratic legitimacy deficit emerges. It can be counter-balanced by other measures, such as either close control by the Parliament or the direct involvement of the public. The latter is the case particularly with the HFEA through the participation of lay members and public consultations. In the Dutch case, the power remains closer to the elected Parliament, but is centred on an individual. The removal of regulatory power away from Parliament may help in reducing the influence of passing fancies and minority views on the regulations. In the case of PGD, the further removed decision-making in the UK leads to relatively permissive policy in a European context, although this may be otherwise in countries with different ethical frameworks. In addition, during the passage of the new HFE Bill, Parliament has confirmed the decisions made by the HFEA. It is clear that recipients of delegated regulatory and decisional power should be carefully selected. Their mandates should be clear and their power curtailed by well-defined requirements with respect to transparency and legitimacy. The ethics council in the Netherlands that will be established needs both a clear mandate and boundaries of its function. This has not been achieved yet and thus renders the council ineffective at best or dangerous at worst.
| Acknowledgement |
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| Footnotes |
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| References and notes |
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M. C Dunn, Z. Gurtin-Broadbent, J. R Wheeler, and J. Ives Jack of all trades, master of none? Challenges facing junior academic researchers in bioethics Clin Ethics, December 1, 2008; 3(4): 160 - 163. [Full Text] [PDF] |
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